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Theorizing Transnational Fiduciary Law 
 
Seth Davis* & Gregory Shaffer** 
 
 
This symposium Article theorizes and assesses transnational legal ordering of fiduciary law. 
Fiduciary law imposes legally enforceable duties on those entrusted with discretionary authority over the 
interests of others. The fiduciary law of a state may apply to fiduciary relationships having a 
transnational (or even global) scope. Fiduciary norms themselves are transnational to the extent that 
they settle as governing legal norms in ways that transcend and permeate state boundaries.  Curiously, 
however, fiduciary legal theory and transnational legal theory have yet to meet. This symposium takes 
the first steps towards a comprehensive theory of transnational fiduciary law. To assess transnational 
legal ordering of fiduciary law, one must study the extent of normative settlement across state boundaries. 
This can be done in terms of a meta concept of fiduciary law involving a transnational body of law, or 
in terms of the processes that give rise to discrete domains of fiduciary law to address particular problems 
as understood by relevant actors. Comparative legal analysis is critical for assessing the extent of 
concordance and divergence in the development and practice of fiduciary law across states. This Article 
introduces symposium articles that assess transnational fiduciary law as a meta concept; transnational 
legal ordering of fiduciary law in discrete domains; and comparative fiduciary law. Together, these articles 
suggest that processes of transnational legal ordering can give rise to transnational fiduciary law and the 
potential development of discrete transnational legal orders that transcend and permeate nation-states.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Fiduciary law is enjoying a “renaissance”1 and transnational legal theory has 
“grown dramatically” since Philip Jessup’s foundational lectures on the subject,2 but 
the two must meet. The transnational dimensions of fiduciary law need exploring. 
Private fiduciary law—the law of agency, trusts, corporations, and other dependent 
relationships—has transnational dimensions, both in its origins and in its 
contemporary applications. This symposium brings together scholars working in the 
common law and civil law traditions to examine private fiduciary duty law’s 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law. E-mail: sethdavis@berkeley.edu. 
** Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Director, Center on Globalization, Law, and Society, University 
of California, Irvine School of Law. E-mail: gshaffer@law.uci.edu.  
1 Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 516 
(2015). 
2 Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231, 232 
(2016). See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). 
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transnational dimensions. It does so through cross-cutting theory and discrete case 
studies. 
Fiduciary law imposes legally enforceable duties—particularly a duty of 
loyalty—in the context of particular relationships of trust and vulnerability. Fiduciaries 
are entrusted with discretionary authority over the interests of others, and fiduciary 
duties are designed to protect the beneficiaries of those delegations. The fiduciary law 
of a state may apply to fiduciary relationships having a transnational (or even global) 
scope. And fiduciary norms themselves are transnational to the extent that they settle 
as governing legal norms in ways that transcend and permeate state boundaries. 
Some transnational legal theory focuses on the functional development of a 
substantive body of law called “transnational law,” while another approach is to focus 
on the processes through which legal norms develop and flow across borders through 
complex processes of transnational legal ordering.3 These latter processes can give rise 
to transnational legal orders (TLOs), a concept developed by Terrence Halliday and 
Gregory Shaffer. The studies in this volume address both dimensions of transnational 
legal theory, but they focus particularly on the processes of transnational legal ordering 
of fiduciary law.  
Halliday and Shaffer define a TLO as “a collection of formalized legal norms 
and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding 
and practice of law across national jurisdictions.”4 A TLO is “legal” insofar as it 
involves norms (i) that are formalized into recognizable legal texts, whether as hard 
law or soft law; (ii) that are produced by, or in conjunction with, bodies or networks 
that transcend the nation-state, whether public or private; and/or (iii) that engage 
bodies within multiple nation-states.5 A TLO is “ordered” where it involves the 
“settlement” of shared norms that involve some regularity of communication, social 
expectation, and behavior.6  A TLO is “transnational” where the norms settle across 
nation-state boundaries.7 Thus understood, TLO theory provides tools for research 
into how transnational legal orders emerge or fail to emerge, or develop or decline and 
disappear in response to the transnational conceptualization of social problems as 
relevant actors construe them. It gives special attention to interactions among 
transnational, national, and local actors, including lawmakers, law implementers, and 
private parties.8 TLO theory has yet to engage with fiduciary law as such. This 
symposium begins to fill the gap. 
 To assess transnational legal ordering of fiduciary law, one must study the 
extent of normative settlement across state boundaries. This can be done in terms of 
a meta concept of fiduciary law involving a transnational body of law, or in terms of 
the processes that give rise to discrete domains of fiduciary law to address particular 
problems as understood by relevant actors. Comparative legal analysis is critical for 
assessing the extent of concordance and divergence in the development and practice 
of fiduciary law across states. This symposium comprises articles that assess 
 
3 Shaffer, supra note 2. 
4   Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERS 3, 5 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).   
5 Id. at 12–17. 
6 Id. at 11. 
7 Id. at 20. 
8 See id. at 38–39 
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transnational fiduciary law as a meta concept; transnational legal ordering of fiduciary 
law in discrete domains; and comparative fiduciary law. Part I addresses the 
development of a general concept of transnational fiduciary law, as set forth in the 
articles by Tamar Frankel and Thilo Kuntz. Part II examines processes of transnational 
legal ordering of fiduciary law in two discrete domains—the law of financial 
intermediaries and of bond markets—as addressed by Jens-Hinrich Binder and Moritz 
Renner. Part III assesses the comparative dimension necessary to determine the extent 
of transnational settlement of legal norms in light of different legal traditions, histories, 
and configurations of interests and perceptions of problems, as covered by Masayuki 
Tamaruya and Mutsuhiko Yukioka (regarding Japan in comparison with the West), 
and Jennifer Hill (regarding Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
within the common law tradition). 
 
I. FIDUCIARY LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL BODY OF LAW OR DISCRETE 
BODIES OF LAW? 
Fiduciary relationships and fiduciary law have a long history. Even so, modern 
legal scholars had not sought to theorize fiduciary law as a field in its own right. As 
Tamar Frankel’s pathbreaking work in the 1980s noted, although “[t]he various types 
of fiduciaries have been studied in the context of specific substantive areas of law,” 
“[f]ew scholars have examined fiduciary legal principles separately from these specific 
contexts.”9 In recent years, scholars from across the globe have revived the field of 
fiduciary legal theory.10 Understood broadly, fiduciary law includes not only the 
familiar fiduciary relationships, but also all “important social and economic 
interactions of high trust and confidence that create an implicit dependency and peculiar 
vulnerability of the beneficiary to the fiduciary.”11 Frankel’s work developed the field 
of fiduciary law building on the meta concept of the fiduciary. In this symposium, she 
applies that concept to assess the development of transnational fiduciary law.   
Broadly speaking, fiduciary law addresses a generic problem. In law and 
economics terms, the problem is one of agency costs.12 In the moralistic terms of many 
common law decisions, the problem is one of holding a person entrusted with 
authority over the interests of another to “something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace.”13   
This problem, Frankel argues, has transnational dimensions that fiduciary law 
scholars would do well to address. For example, theorists of fiduciary law have only 
begun to grapple with the rise of the “international trust.”14 Increasingly, trusts have 
international—or, perhaps more accurately, “transnational”—linkages given the rise 
of global wealth and wealthy transnational families, and the emergence of offshore 
 
9 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983). 
10 Miller & Gold, supra note 1, at 516. 
11 Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary 
Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 933 (2011). 
12 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 624 
(2004) (developing “systematic application of agency theory to the law of donative trusts”). 
13 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
14 Rebecca Lee, The Evolution of the Modern International Trust: Developments and Challenges, 103 IOWA 
L. REV. 2069 (2018). 
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jurisdictions to hold and manage that wealth.15 Rebecca Lee has argued that in the 
modern era, “the trust’s development has not been dominated by English law, but by 
various offshore jurisdictions who have achieved notable developments.”16 States such 
as the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have adopted England’s Trustee Act with 
significant modifications, while other states, such as Belize, have enacted 
comprehensive trust statutes, each aimed at creating an offshore market for 
international trust business.17 Perhaps even more interesting, onshore jurisdictions 
have begun to adopt some of the offshore modifications, which Lionel Smith has 
called the “onshoring of the offshore.” Sixteen states in the United States have adopted 
asset protection trusts, with the first (Alaska) adopting the device from Cook Islands 
law.18 These developments invite us to understand trust law by looking to horizontal 
interactions among onshore and offshore jurisdictions in the development of the 
international trust.    
The contributors to this volume confront the transnational dimensions and 
possibilities of fiduciary law. The first, Tamar Frankel’s Transnational Fiduciary Law, 
shows that the fiduciary concept has deep historical roots across multiple legal systems. 
Fiduciary law, Frankel argues, responds to a particular social problem of trust and 
dependence that all human societies face. Fiduciaries offer specialized expertise and 
services to beneficiaries, who rely upon the fiduciary’s entrusted authority and who 
expect that fiduciary to apply it loyally and carefully. Fiduciary law encourages the 
formation of such socially desirable relationships. In one form or another, many 
societies “have adopted fiduciary rules or similar initiatives” to regulate relationships 
of trust and dependence.19     
 Frankel provides a meta account of how fiduciary law is emerging as a legal 
order to regulate transnational relationships of trust and dependence. Surveying the 
spread of fiduciary law through colonialism, the emergence of global financial centers, 
and the deepening of economic integration through international trade, she shows that 
fiduciary law addresses a problem having transnational dimensions. While fiduciary 
law is often considered a common law system, owing to its association with the 
common law trust as a device for managing assets, fiduciary principles have emerged 
in civil law countries as well, including Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan. The 
“transplantation”20 of modern fiduciary law into civil law countries has not been 
seamless, however. Frankel therefore stresses the need for transnational institutions 
and principles to move towards a more unified approach to the problem of trust and 
dependence, while acknowledging that complete concordance across national legal 
systems is neither likely nor desirable. Such institutions may include self-regulatory 
bodies such as the Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation (MUTB), which, 
Frankel finds, “has been following a unique approach to promote trust by serving its 
 
15 Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Rise of the International Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 519, 520–
23 (1999). 
16 Lee, supra note 14, at 2076–77. 
17 David Brownhill, The Role of Offshore Jurisdictions in the Development of the International Trust, 32 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 953, 953 (1999).   
18 Lionel Smith, Give the People What They Want? The Onshoring of the Offshore, 103 IOWA L. REV. 
2155, 2166–67 (2018).   
19 Tamar Frankel, Transnational Fiduciary Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
20 Id. (manuscript at 9). 
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diverse client portfolio with a heightened standard of care and loyalty.” Considering 
the MUTB as an example, Frankel acknowledges that local culture and customs play a 
central role in the operation of fiduciary norms of loyalty and care, which complicates 
the prospects for the emergence of transnational fiduciary law. 
 Taking up the challenge posed by Frankel, several of the symposium authors 
grapple with whether there is transnational normative settlement around fiduciary 
norms. Engaging with the theory of transnational legal orders (TLOs) developed by 
Halliday and Shaffer, these authors ask whether there is such a thing as a transversal 
understanding or practice of transnational fiduciary law or rather if it should best be 
assessed in discrete domains involving the development of particularized TLOs to 
address particular issues. Thilo Kuntz’s Transnational Fiduciary Law: Space and Elements 
explores the challenge of theorizing fiduciary law and transnational law together when 
both concepts can prove “elusive.”21 Like Frankel, Kuntz sees the problem that 
fiduciary law seeks to solve as one that cuts across common law and civil law traditions, 
whether it be the English trust or the contract-based Treuhandverhältnisse in German 
law. Thus, from a functional perspective of comparative law, there is a common “point 
of entry for transnational fiduciary law.”22 The more difficult question, Kuntz argues, 
is whether a transnational body of fiduciary law is emerging as a result of domestic 
legal responses to that common problem of trust or through transnational processes.  
 To answer that question, Kuntz looks to the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of transnational legal ordering. In his account, transnational fiduciary law 
can emerge horizontally from entanglement among national legal systems. For 
example, the emergence of trust law in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China resulted 
from close ties among their legal systems. Methodologically, to trace the development 
of fiduciary law through these transnational ties requires an historical perspective and 
orientation to legal processes that conventional comparative law tends to lack. 
Theoretically, this example challenges a sharp distinction between the national and 
transnational: “If several nation-states generate, say, trust law, and this process of norm 
production is interdependent, because legislators and courts of each of the states look 
at what the other is doing, does this not also constitute transnational law?”23 The mutual 
entanglement of legal systems, Kuntz adds, also challenges conceptions of what 
fiduciary law is and how it works by “producing a transnational version of fiduciary 
law” with “different shades of loyalty” when compared with the common law 
conception that is central to theorizing about fiduciary law.24   
 From the perspective of TLO theory, the vertical dimension of transnational 
legal ordering should be considered along with this horizontal entanglement of legal 
systems. Kuntz points to efforts to integrate environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) issues into corporate decision-making as an example of vertical ordering of 
transnational fiduciary law.25 Such soft law norms, which have been developed by 
 
21 Thilo Kuntz, Transnational Fiduciary Law: Spaces and Elements, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L 
TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1, 3) (quoting Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond 
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 79 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988)).   
22 Id. (manuscript at 4). 
23 Id. (manuscript at 8).   
24 Id. (manuscript at 6, 31). 
25 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Global Reporting Initiative, Transnational Corporate Accountability, and 
Global Regulatory Counter-Currents, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 67, 67 (2016), for 
another account of ESG from the perspective of TLO theory. 
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international actors such as the United Nations and the OECD, have emerged as a 
body of transnational fiduciary law. The UN Environment Program’s 2015 report 
“Fiduciary Duty for the 21st Century,” the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, and the G20/OECD 2015 principles on corporate governance 
constitute a body of soft law that “has to be reckoned with” at the national and local 
levels.26 For example, the loi PACTE, a body of reforms to article 1833 of France’s 
Code Civil that establishes obligations to consider environmental and social issues in 
corporate decision-making, emerged from reform proposals that looked in part to the 
UN frameworks for ESG. Non-state actors, including some of the world’s largest 
investment firms, have also incorporated these transnational principles within their 
internal organizational working documents and practices, applying them at the local 
level.   
 That is not to say, however, that there is a unified body of transnational 
fiduciary law. To the contrary, Kuntz argues that several different TLOs involving 
fiduciary norms are emerging from the horizontal entanglement of national lawmakers 
and the vertical interactions among transnational, national, and local actors. Case 
studies of transnational legal ordering of fiduciary norms in different domains are thus 
needed. 
 
II. CASE STUDIES OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW IN DISCRETE DOMAINS 
To assess the development of particularized TLOs based on fiduciary 
principles, detailed case studies are critical. Jens-Hinrich Binder examines the 
transnational development of legal requirements for financial intermediaries in his 
article Transnational Fiduciary Law in Financial Intermediation: Are We There Yet? A Case 
Study in the Emergence of Transnational Legal Ordering.27 Like Kuntz, Binder begins by 
noting that fiduciary norms (and their functional equivalents) reflect longstanding 
responses to common problems across common law and civil law jurisdictions. Binder 
seeks to determine whether the transnational development of the norms governing the 
relationship between financial intermediaries and their customers represents an 
emerging TLO.   
Financial intermediaries provide financial services ranging from holding assets 
on behalf of clients, transacting on their behalf, and/or providing investment or loan 
advice. While not all financial intermediaries are universally recognized as fiduciaries 
by jurists or commentators, their relationships to their customers involve aspects 
common to all fiduciary relationships, including trust, dependency, and vulnerability. 
In recent years, there has been a convergence across multiple legal systems’ treatment 
of financial intermediaries, one in which fiduciary duties are “increasingly . . . accepted 
as an analytical framework.”28  
 Has this convergence led to the emergence of a transnational legal order? On 
the one hand, Binder argues that we must distinguish between ex ante regulation of 
financial intermediaries by administrative agencies and ex post adjudication of 
 
26 Kuntz, supra note 21 (manuscript at 24). 
27 Jens-Hinrich Binder, Transnational Fiduciary Law in Financial Intermediation: Are We There Yet? A 
Case Study in the Emergence of Transnational Legal Ordering, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
28 Id. (manuscript at 3). 
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“fiduciary duties proper” by courts.29 With this distinction in mind, he shows that the 
convergence across regulatory regimes is not matched by a convergence in private 
fiduciary law. On the other hand, a “common theme” is developing across jurisdictions 
involving interactions and tensions among regulatory requirements and private law. In 
this sense, “fiduciary activities by financial intermediaries are the object of an emerging 
transnational legal order.”30 
 To develop this argument, Binder focuses upon standard setting by the 
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) and regulatory 
requirements developed by European lawmakers. The IOSCO principles, first 
published in the 1990s, reflected a convergence across legal systems around certain 
norms to order financial intermediaries’ provision of services. These principles, in turn, 
influenced European lawmaking under the European Economic Community in 1993, 
and under the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2014 through the Financial 
Instruments Directives adopted by the European Parliament. Based on this case study, 
Binder develops the concept of “functional fiduciary law,” that is, a body of regulatory 
law that has fiduciary roots and fiduciary characteristics.31 For example, the “conduct-
of-business requirements in the IOSCO principles, with their focus on establishing 
‘functional fiduciary law’ (a duty of care and skill in the interest of customers and on 
preventing or, at least, mitigating potential conflicts of interest . . .), bears parallels with 
. . . traditional” fiduciary principles from private law.32 The concept of “functional 
fiduciary law” challenges the private law focus of much fiduciary legal theory by 
incorporating public regulatory requirements for the conduct of business into the 
analysis. It sheds light on the challenge of reconciling public regulation with private 
fiduciary law, a challenge that, Binder argues, cuts across European jurisdictions in 
light of EU conduct-of-business norms. In light of this challenge, and the continuing 
divergence of private law across jurisdictions, Binder concludes that there is an 
emerging process of transnational legal ordering, but so far no settled transnational 
legal order imposing fiduciary norms on financial intermediaries. 
 Moritz Renner, in his article Transnational Fiduciary Law in Bond Markets: A Case 
Study, shows how private ordering and soft law can give rise to a transnational legal 
order for bond markets.33 Renner focuses on net short debt investing, a strategy where 
bondholders take a net short position in credit default swaps to profit from a bond-
issuer’s default. Taking the recent Windstream v. Aurelius case from the United States as 
its starting point,34 Renner’s article shows that net short debt investing gives rise to 
multiple relationships involving potential vulnerability: that between bondholders and 
issuers, that among bondholders, and that between the bondholder and the swap 
counterparty. Although these three types of relationships may be treated differently in 
common law versus civil law jurisdictions, it is unlikely that fiduciary duties would 
apply to any of them under current law. The result, Renner argues, is that market 
participants are especially vulnerable and without a private law remedy against a 
 
29 Id. (manuscript at 4). 
30 Id. (manuscript at 5). 
31 Id. (manuscript at 13). 
32 Id. (manuscript at 14). 
33 Moritz Renner, Transnational Fiduciary Law in Bond Markets: A Case Study, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L 
TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2020). 
34 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Windstream Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-7857 (JMF), 2019 WL 948120 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019). 
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practice that violates their reasonable expectations. The normative problem—and a 
potential solution founded upon transnational fiduciary law—becomes apparent when 
one considers the transnational dimensions of net short debt investing.   
 Drawing upon TLO theory and fiduciary legal theory, Renner argues that 
fiduciary law has the potential to support social norms and the reasonable expectations 
of participants in bond markets. He shows that global bond markets can be 
understood as a TLO that has emerged from private ordering, including the 
standardized documentation developed by the Securities Industry and Financial and 
Markets Association (SIFMA) and the International Capital Market Association. 
Bond-issuers typically rely upon these standardized provisions, which leave the 
contracting parties free to create a fiduciary relationship by agreement, but which do 
not necessarily mention fiduciary duties. Even so, bond market participants generally 
expect each other to follow norms not specified by hard law instruments that are 
necessary for market functioning. The Windstream case was unusual insofar as Aurelius, 
a hedge fund, accelerated the bond in response to a technical default, leading to the 
bankruptcy of Windstream. Such an action is rare in global bond markets. Market 
participants’ expectations about bondholders’ conduct can, Renner argues, be 
understood in fiduciary terms. Drawing upon Deborah DeMott and Paul Finn’s work 
on “justifiable expectations of loyalty” in fiduciary relationships,35 Renner argues that 
Aurelius had a fiduciary duty not to accelerate the bond and cause Windstream’s 
collapse in light of the justifiable expectations of the parties in transnational bond 
markets. Parties, as they seem to have done in Windstream, may opt out of such 
fiduciary duty by agreement. But where parties have not done so, Renner argues that 
something like a fiduciary relationship exists between bond-issuers and bondholders 
given market participants’ informal expectations about cooperation and good faith. 
 Renner’s article thus raises questions about private ordering common to both 
transnational legal theory and fiduciary legal theory. Transnational legal scholars, for 
example, have explored how private actors may develop functional substitutes for state 
law. And fiduciary law scholars have contrasted state law with private ordering as 
mechanisms for enforcing fiduciary norms of behavior. Renner invites us to connect 
these bodies of work by seeing transnational fiduciary law as extending beyond formal 
law to customary practices that support justifiable expectations of conduct in 
relationships of trust and special vulnerability to self-serving behavior.  
 Together, these articles suggest that processes of transnational legal ordering 
can give rise to transnational fiduciary law and the potential development of discrete 
transnational legal orders that transcend and permeate nation-states. Some TLOs may 
be settled, while others are only beginning to emerge. Some may involve hard law, 
while others involve soft law, business custom, and social expectations. Much work 
remains to be done on the horizontal and vertical dimensions of transnational legal 
ordering of fiduciary law, giving rise to varying degrees of normative settlement 
regarding transnational businesses’ fiduciary duties. 
 
 
 
 
35 See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their 
Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006); Paul Finn, Contract and the Fiduciary Principle, 12 U. NEW S. 
WALES L.J. 76 (1989). 
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III. HOW TO COMPARE FIDUCIARY LAW ACROSS LEGAL SYSTEMS? 
To understand the extent that legal norms settle across national jurisdictions, 
comparative law work is required in terms of formal law and practice. Comparative 
law scholars working within particular fields of fiduciary law have developed important 
insights into similarities and distinctions among the fiduciary law of different states. 
There is, for instance, a wealth of studies of comparative corporate law. But much of 
this work takes a static perspective, one that tells us little about interactions across 
jurisdictions and the transnational development of fiduciary law in terms of actual 
practice. 
One line of inquiry of transnational fiduciary legal theory concerns what 
Masayuki Tamaruya has called “the global evolution of the fiduciary norm.”36 With his 
co-author Mutushkio Yukioka, he explores this process of transnational legal ordering 
in The Japanese Law of Fiduciaries from Comparative and Transnational Perspectives.37 Tamaruya 
and Yukioka show how the introduction of Western conceptions of loyalty interacted 
in complex ways with longstanding status-based conceptions of loyalty to family elders 
and to authority within Japan. Though these status-based conceptions have been 
largely absent from modern legislation, they have persisted as important norms that 
order behavior, including the relationship between employees and firms. As Tamaruya 
and Yukioka explain, Japanese styles of corporate management and the Japanese 
concept of the corporation as a community of employees cannot be understood simply 
by applying the shareholder-primacy account of corporate law used in the United 
States. Rather, these norms, modes, and behaviors stand in tension with hard law 
reforms and may be understood in part by reference to traditional, status-based 
conceptions of loyalty. 
Thus, the development of Japanese fiduciary law has been a dynamic process 
in which hard and soft law institutions and norms interact. Tamaruya and Yukioka 
caution that the story of Japanese fiduciary law is not simply one of the “percolation 
of local morals into legal norms.”38 Rather, in their account, a gradual erosion of 
traditional, status-based norms of loyalty created a gap that modern fiduciary law, 
much of it drawn from transnational interactions and sources, eventually filled through 
hard law. In the corporate law context, for example, “as the non-statutory soft-law 
norms published and updated by quasi-public bodies gradually become part of market 
practices, they receive careful approval through case law.”39 Over time, this body of 
Japanese fiduciary law has “increasingly become reflective” of corporate governance 
norms from Western legal traditions.40 However, as Tamaruya and Yukioka’s detailed 
historical account demonstrates, this process has “generated tensions and a heated 
reaction in Japan.”41 In Japan, the development and use of soft law and optional 
regulation mediated these tensions for a time, while various domestic actors worked 
 
36 Masayuki Tamaruya, Japanese Law and the Global Diffusion of Trust and Fiduciary Law, 103 IOWA 
L. REV. 2229, 2230 (2018).   
37 Masayuki Tamaruya & Mutushiko Yukioka, The Japanese Law of Fiduciaries from Comparative and 
Transnational Perspectives, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2020). 
38 Id. (manuscript at 28). 
39 Id. (manuscript at 19). 
40 Id.  
41 Id. (manuscript at 10).   
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through lawmaking institutions, such as courts, to “harden the regulations.”42 The 
development of Japanese fiduciary law—and Japan’s ultimate movement towards “the 
American duty of loyalty” —has been a complex process involving the transnational, 
national, and local planes of legal norm development and practice.   
Thus told, the story of Japanese fiduciary law reflects the idea of transnational 
legal ordering as a process. Halliday and Shaffer argue that the development of 
transnational legal orders is dynamic and recursive involving interaction among 
international, transnational, national, and local actors.43 Tamaruya and Yukioka’s 
account shows how this may be borne out in the global evolution of fiduciary norms. 
Their study raises important questions for fiduciary legal theory, including the 
complications that arise when the concept of fiduciary loyalty is implemented in a 
particular field. These complications include not only ones of legal infrastructure (such 
as how will the fiduciary norms be enforced), but also of the economic system and 
normative environment. 
Jennifer Hill also combines comparative corporate law with a dynamic 
perspective in Shifting Contours of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Norms in Comparative 
Corporate Governance. She first shows that the broad similarities in corporate law in 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States can mask important differences 
that have significant consequences for the accountability of directors and officers in 
practice.44 These differences, Hill argues, undermine the “law matters” hypothesis in 
“legal origins” theory (promulgated by La Porta and other economists), which holds 
that legal protections for investors vary systematically between common law and civil 
law countries and that differences among these protections are “a strong predictor of 
financial development.”45 In particular, Hill contends, this hypothesis “overstated the 
similarities within the common law world itself.”46 For example, the American concept 
of “entire fairness,” which permits judicial invocation of “fair dealing” and “fair 
price,”47 is not recognized in UK or Australian law. Nor are the safe harbors shielding 
directors from liability the same across these three common law jurisdictions. 
Hill examines differences in the dynamic interaction between fiduciary law and 
other modes of regulating corporate governance in these jurisdictions. Much like 
Binder’s conception of “functional fiduciary law,” which examines the interaction of 
public regulatory law with traditional fiduciary law, Hill’s application of Ronald 
Gilson’s “braided framework” metaphor examines the interaction between multiple 
forms of law as they bear upon the behavior of fiduciaries.48 She argues that fiduciary 
law as such has shifted over time from serving as the primary mechanism for ordering 
corporate management to being one mechanism among several. She shows how the 
rise of corporate governance codes “epitomize” this shift.49 These codes may 
 
42 Id. (manuscript at 29). 
43 Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 38–39. 
44 Jennifer G. Hill, Shifting Contours of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Norms in Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 5 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2020). 
45 Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LT. 285, 286 (2008). 
46 Hill, supra note 44 (manuscript at 9). 
47 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
48 Hill, supra note 44 (manuscript at 2) (quoting Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate 
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 6 (Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018)). 
49 Id. (manuscript at 16). 
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supplement fiduciary law, but they may also be in tension with a director’s common 
law fiduciary duties.   
Differences among the corporate governance codes of Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States reflect different origins and different alignments of 
domestic legal and business actors. The United States Corporate Governance 
Principles are a voluntary and self-regulatory framework developed by an association 
of large US-based asset owners and managers, including the Big Three of BlackRock, 
Vanguard, and State Street. These principles adopt the shareholder-primacy model. By 
contrast, the UK code is administered by a public regulator, while the Australian code 
was developed by a stock exchange. Both the UK and Australian codes, unlike the 
American code, adopt a more “public conception of the corporation” and corporate 
managers’ obligations towards stakeholders and society.50 
This dynamic comparison of Australian, UK, and US law illustrates the 
importance of theorizing transnational fiduciary law in terms of the actors producing, 
contesting, and implementing it. As Halliday and Shaffer theorize, transnational legal 
orders rise and fall through “the production and implementation” of legal norms 
among actors at the transnational, national, and local levels.51 Actors may struggle over 
the diagnosis of the problem to be solved—in the corporate governance context, for 
instance, is it inattention to the interests of shareholders or disregard for the interests 
of the public? They may exploit contradictions and indeterminacies within the law. 
They may contest the existence or legitimacy of a transnational legal order.52 Through 
these recursive processes, a transnational legal order may emerge through normative 
settlement and institutionalization, or it may not; it may develop, or it may decline and 
fall. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The articles in this symposium illustrate the dynamics of transnational legal 
ordering of fiduciary law and the importance of detailed case studies regarding the role 
and interaction of different actors, interests, and legal traditions. Much work remains 
to be done to link transnational legal theory with fiduciary legal theory. The 
contributions to this symposium show the way. They illustrate how fiduciary law has 
developed in particular areas through interactions among transnational, national, and 
local actors. “Law can no longer be viewed through a purely national lens”53 —and 
that includes fiduciary law.   
 
 
 
   
 
    
 
50 Id. (manuscript at 20).   
51 Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 38.   
52 See id. at 38–40.   
53  Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 4, at 63. 
